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on which the brief is filed.
^6. Size and Type. Briefs shall be nine inches in length and
six inches in width, so as to conform in dimensions to the
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printed. The record number of the case and the names and
addresses of counsel submitting the brief shall he printed on
the front cover.
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RULE 5:12—BRIEFS
§1. Form and Contents of Appellant's Brief. The opening brief of appellant shall
contam. A index and table of citations with cases alphabetically arranged. The
citation of Virginia cases shall be to the ofiicial Virginia Reports and, in addition,
may refer to other reports containing such cases.
(b) A brief statement of the material proceedings in the lower court, the errors
assigned, and the questions involved in the appeal.
(c) A clear and concise statement of the facts, with references to the pages ot
the printed record when there is any possibility that the other side may question the
statement. When the facts are in dispute the brief shall so state.
(d) With respect to each assignment of error relied on, the principles of law, the
argument and the authorities shall be stated in one place and not scattered through
(e)*^ The signature of at least one attorney practicing in this Court, and his address.
§2. Form and Contents of Appellee's Brief. The brief for the appellee shall con-
(a) A subject index and table of citations with cases alphabetically arranged. Cita
tions of Virginia cases must refer to the Virginia Reports and, in addition, may refer
to other reports containing such eases. . , „ i-
(b) A statement of the case and of the points involved, if the appellee disagrees
with the statement of appellant.
(c) A statement of the facts which are necessary to correct or amplify the state
ment in appellant's brief in so far as it is deemed erroneous or inadequate, with ap
propriate references to the pages of the record.
(d) Argument in support of the position of appellee. _
The brief shall be signed by at least one attorney practicing m this Court, givingIns a^ddre^^.^^^ appellant shall contain all the
authorities relied on by him not referred to in his opening brief. In other respects
it shall conform to the requirements for appellee's brief. . . . , • -j
§4 Time of Filing. As soon as the estimated cost of printing the record is paid
bv the appellant, the clerk shall forthwith proceed to have printed a sufficient number
of copies of the record or the designated parts. Upon receipt of the pnnted copies
or of the substituted copies allowed in lieu of printed copies under Rule 5:2, the
clerk shall forthwith mark the filing date on each copy and transmit three copies of
the printed record to each counsel of record, or notify each counsel of record of the
filing date of the substituted copies. r, i • . t i. a: -.u-
(a) The opening brief of the appellant shall be filed in the clerks office withm
twenty-one days after the date the printed copies of the record, or the substituted
copies allowed under Rule 5:2, are filed in the clerk's office. The brief of the ap-
pellee shall be filed in the clerk's office not less than twenty-one days, and the reply
brief of the appellant not less than two days, before the first day of the session at
whicli the case is to be heard. , r . . . t. f ,i. k
(b) Unless the appellant's brief is filed at least forty-two days before the be-
cinning of the next session of the Court, the case, in the absence of stipulation of
counsel will not be called at that session of the Court; provided, however, that a
criminal case may be called at the next session if the Commonwealth s brief is filed at
least fourteen days prior to the calling of the case, in which event the reply brief for
the appellant shall be filed not later than the day before the case is called. This para
graph does not extend the time allowed by paragraph (a) above for the filing of the
appellant^^bnch opposing parties may file with the clerk a written stipulation
changing tlie time for filing briefs in any case; provided, however, that all briefs
must be filed not later than the day before such case is to he heard
§5. Number of Copies. Twenty-five copies of each brief shall be filed with the
clerk of the Court, and at least three copies mailed or delivered to opposing counsel on
or before the day on which the brief is filed. , . . ,
§6 Size and Type, Briefs shall be nine inches m length and six inches m width,
so as to conform in dimensions to the printed record, and shall be printed in type not
less in size, as to height and width, than the type in which the record is printed. The
record number of the case and the names and addresses of counsel submitting the brief
shall be printed on the front cover. . u j k • r • i-
§7 Effect of NoncompUance. If neither party has filed a brief m compliance with
the requirements of this rule, the Court will not hear oral argument. If one party hai
but the other has not filed such a brief, the party in default will not be heard orally.
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Record No. 4036
VIRGINIA;
In the Clerk's Office of the Supreme Court of Appeals at
Richmond on the 13th day of August, 1952.
RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, INCORPORATED, .
Appellant,
against
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, • Appellee.
Prom the State Corporation Commission.
This is to certify that upon the petition of Railway Express
Agency, Incorporated, (No. 10,629), an appeal as of right
has been awarded by one of the Justices of the Supreme Court
of Appeals on the 12th day of August, 1952, from an order
entered by the State Corporation Commission on the 16th day
of June, 1952, in re application of Railway Express Agency,
Incorporated, no bond being required.
IN THE
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virgiuia
AT RICHMOND
Record No. 4037
VIRGINIA:
In the Clerk's Office of the Supreme Court of Appeals at
Richmond on the 13th day of August, 1952.
RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, INCORPORATED,
.  ^ Appellant,
against
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Appellee.
From tlie State Corporation Commission.
This IS to certify that upon the petition of Railway Express
Agency, Incorporated, (No. 10,767), an appeal as of right
has been awarded by one of the Justices of the Supreme Court
of Appeals on the 12th day of August, 1052, from an order
entered by the State Corporation Commission on the 16th day
of June, 1952, in re. application of Railway Express Agency
Incorporated, no bond being required. '
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RECORD
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
BEFORE THE
STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION
PETITION OF RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, INCOR
PORATED, (FOR CORRECTION OF ASSESSMENT
OF A LICENSE TAX FOR THE YEAR 1950, AND
FOR A REFUND OF SUCH LICENSE TAX).
(Case No. 10629)
To the Honorable, the State Corporation Commission of
Virginia:
Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, a corporation or
ganized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware
and having its principal place of business at 230 Park Ave
nue, New York, New York, respectfully presents this Petition
pursuant to the provisions of Section 58-1122 of the Code of
Virginia, 1050, and represents to your Honorable Body as
follows:
1. That it is engaged in the handling and transportation of
goods, wares and merchandise in express service by means of
railway cars, motor trucks and airplanes in each of States
of the United States, including the State of Virginia, m which
it sought but was denied authority by this Honorable Body
on April 8, 1929, to transact such business in intrcustate com
merce in this State,
page 2\ 2. That pursuant to the opinion of the Bupreme
Court of Appeals of Vii^giiiia (158 Va. 498) affirm
ing the foregoing decision of your Honorable Body, your Pe
titioner caused Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, of
Virginia to be organized under the laws of this State on Oc
tober 20, 1931, for the purpose of conducting express service
in intrastate commerce in this State, and that corporation,
as a wholly ovmed subsidiary of your petitioner, has since
1932 conducted the intrastate exp^ss business in Virginia
theretofore conducted by your Petitioner.
3. That Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, of Vir
ginia has since 1933 reported to your Honorable Body, been
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assessed with and has paid annually all taxes on property and
money used and employed by it "in intrastate commerce in
this State, including a license tax (for the privilege of doing
business iii this State) based on its gross receipts from opera
tions in this State, as required by Section 58-547 and its ante
cedent sections of the Tax Code of Virginia. That the said
Virginia Company paid a license tax in the year 1950 in the
amount of $16,109.92, based upon its gross receipts from op
erations in this State in the year 1949 in the amount of $749,-
298.77.
4. That your Petitioner has since 1930 reported to your
Honorable Body and been assessed with and has paid an
nually all taxes on property and money used and employed
by it in interstate commerce in this State, and has
page 3 [■ likewise reported, under protest, been assessed with
in the manner hereinafter stated, and has paid an
nually, under protest, a license tax (for the privilege of doing
business in this State) allegedly based on its gross receipts
from business beginning and ending within this State and on
all receipts earned in this State on business passing through,
into and out of this State, as required by Section 58-547 and
its antecedent sections of the Tax Code of Virginia.
5. That the legality, manner of determining and amount of
tlie license tax assessable annually against your Petitioner,
under authority of Section 58-547 and its antecedent sections
of the Code of Virginia, have been the subject of frequent
hearings, formal and infoi-mal, before your Honorable Body,
with the result that various methods and formulae for de
termining the gross reecipts of your Petitioner subject to as
sessment in this State, and the amount of license taxes an
nually to be imposed thereon, have not been uniform or
strictly within the requirements of the aforesaid section of
the Tax Code of Virginia, and, while accepting the various
assessments annually made against it in this respect by your
Honorable Body and while pajdng the license taxes annually
imposed against it in pursuance of such assessments, allegedly
under authority of the aforesaid Section 58-547 and its ante
cedent sections of the Code of Virginia, your Petitioner has
consistently denied liability therefore, and has paid
page 4 }■ all such taxes so imposed upon it under protest. In
general, the form of protest accompanying each an
nual report by Petitioner to your Honorable Body of its gross
receipts "on business passing through, into or out of this
State" has been as follows:
"This company does an interstate business through, into
and out of Virginia but it has no way of ascertaining how
much of the receipts on that business is earned in Virginia.
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"The business pasing through, into, or out of this State
is interstate business and is not subject to taxation by the
State. It is understood that this report is intended to be
used as the basis for levying a tax under Section 219 of the
Tax Code of Virginia, which prescribes a license tax for the
privilege of doing business in Virginia, and which is imposed
upon gross receipts. The $ reported as *A11 Receipts
earned in Virginia on business passing through, into or out
of this State' is computed in accordance with an understand
ing had with the State Corporation Commission of Virginia,
and is made without prejudice to the protest of this Company
against any tax being levied upon, or measured by such re
ceipts. Protestant cannot, lawfully, be required to pay a
license tax for the privilege of doing an interstate business in
Virginia, as such tax cannot, legally, be imposed upon gross
receipts derived exclusively from interstate commerce, and
the tax if applied to the interstate receipts of protestant,
would violate the commerce clause of the Constitution of the
United States, and therefore is beyond the legal authority
of the State of Virginia to levy."
and upon all remittances made by Petitioner of amounts paid
by it on account of license taxes so imposed against it, it has
designated the same as "Paid Under Protest" and receipts
issued to it by the Treasurer of the State of Virginia have
uniformly recited and recognized that such license fees were
"Paid Under Protest".
page 5 [■ That gross receipts in the amount of $3,286,776.70
were determined by your Honorable Body to
have been d erived by Petitioner in the year 1949 from
the conduct of its express business in interstate com
merce on 3,652.87 miles of railroad and steamship com
panies over the lines of which your Petitioner operated
in this State, upon which a tax, at the rate of $899.78
in the aggregate amount of $70,665.68, was imposed in the
year 1950.
6. That the business of your Petitioner in the carrying of
goods, wares and merchandise in express service over lines
of railroad and steamship companies operating in this State
is wholly interstate in character, gross receipts derived there
from are not subject to taxation under and by virtue of the
laws of the State of Virginia, and the license tax annually
sought to be imposed therein by Section 58-547 and its ante
cedent sections of the Code of Virginia is therefore uncon
stitutional, null and void in that it is sought to be imposed
upon the right and privilege of your petitioner to do an
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interstate express business in this State, and constitutes a
direct burden upon such commerce and a tax upon your Peti
tioner for the privilege of engaging therein, in contravention
of the provisions of Article I, Section 8, paragraph 3, of the
Constitution of the United States, conferring upon the Con
gress thereof the sole and exclusive power to reg*ulate com
merce among the several States.
page 6 }■ WHEEEFOBE, your Petitioner respectfully
praj'^s that the assessment against it by your Honor
able Body of a license tax for the year 1950, in the amount of
$70,665.68, may be reviewed and corrected, and held to be in
valid, null and void, that the said 1950 assessment may be
expunged and removed from the public records, and that the
Comptroller be directed and required to draw a warrant in
favor of your Petitioner on the Treasurer of the State of
Virginia, pursuant to the provisions of Section 58-1124 of
the Code of Virginia, in the amount of $70,665.68, with in
terest thereon from the date of payment, in refund of the tax
so paid by Petitioner.
And your Petitioner will ever pray, etc.
RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY,
INCORPORATED,
By W. A. BENSON, Vice President.
THOMAS B. GAY
Attorney.
State of New York,
County of New York, to-wit:
This day personally appeared before me, James F. Guyre, a
Notary Public in and for the State and County aforesaid,
W. A. Benson, who made oath that he is a Vice President of
Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, that he
page 7 } has read the foregoing petition, and that the mat
ters and things stated therein are true to the best
of his knowledge and belief.
W. A. BENSON
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of July,
1951.
My Commission expires: March 30, 1952.
JAMES F. GUYRE
Notary Public.
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James F. Guyre, Notary Public, State of New York.
Qualified in Bronx County No. 03-6711200. Certificates
filed with New York & Kings County Clerks, Bronx, N. Y.
& Kings Begs. Offices. Term expires March 30, 1962.
page 8 } COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
BEFORE THE
STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION
PETITION OF RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, IN
CORPORATED, (FOR CORRECTION OF ASSESS
MENT OF A LICENSE TAX FOR THE YEAR 1951,
AND FOR A REFUND OF SUCH LICENSE TAX).
(Case No. 10767)
To the Honorable, the State Corporation Commission of
Virginia:
Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Dela
ware and having its principal place of business at 230 Park
Avenue, New York, New York, respectfully presents this
Petition pursuant to the provisions of the statutes of the
State of Virginia in such cases made and provided, and repre
sents to your Honorable Body as follows:
1. That it is engaged in the handling and transportation of
goods, wares and merchandise in express service by means
of railway cars, motor trucks and airplanes in each of the
States of the United States, including the State of Virginia,
in which it is sought but was denied authority by this Honor
able Body on April 8, 1929, to transact such business in intror-
state commerce in this State.
2. That pursuant to the opinion of the Supreme
page 9 [ Court of Appeals of Virginia (163 Va. 498) affinn-
ing the foregoing decision of your Honorable Body,
your Petitioner caused Railway Express Agency, Incorpor
ated, of Virginia to be organized under the laws of this State
on October 20, 1931, for the purpose of conducting express
service in intrastate commerce in this State, and that corpor
ation, as a wholly owned subsidiary of your Petitioner, has
since 1932 conducted the intrastate express business in Vir
ginia theretofore conducted by your Petitioner.
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3. That Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, of Vir
ginia has since 1J)33 reported to your Honorable Body, been
assessed with and has paid annually all taxes on property
and money used and employed by it in intrastate commerce
in this State, including a license tax (for the privilege of
doing business in this State) based on its gross receipts from
operations in this State, as required by Section 58-547 and
its antecedent sections of the Tax Code of Virginia. That the
said Virginia Company paid a license tax in the year 1951
in the amount of $13,377.56, based upon its gross receipts
from operations in this State in the year 1950 in the amount
of $622,211.90.
4. That your Petitioner has since 1930 reported to your
Honorable Body and been assessed with and has paid annually
all taxes on property and money used and employed by it in
interstate commerce in this State, and has likewise reported,
under protest, been assessed with, in the manner
page 10 [• hereinafter stated, and has paid annually, under
protest, a license tax (for the privilege of doing
business in this State) allegedly based on its gross receipts
from business beginning and ending within this State and on
all receipts earned in this State on business passing through,
into and out of this State, as required by Section 5^8-547 and
its antecedent sections of the Tax Code of Virginia.
5. That the legality, manner of determining and amount
of license tax assessable annually against your Petitioner,
under authority of Section 58-547 and its antecedent sections
of its Code of Virginia, have been the subject of frequent
hearings, formal and informal, before your Honorable Body,
with the result that various methods and formulae for de
termining the gross receipts of your Petitioner subject to
assessment in this State, and the amount of license taxes
annually to be imposed thereon, have not been uniform or
strictly within the requirements of the aforesaid section of
the Tax Code of Virginia, and, while accepting the various
assessments annually made against it in this respect by your
Honorable Body and while paying the license taxes annually
imposed against it in pursuance of such assessments, al
legedly under authority of the aforesaid Section 58-547 and
its antecedent sections of the Code of Virginia, your Petition
er has consistently denied liability therefor, and has paid all
such taxes so imposed upon it under protest. In
page 11 }■ general, the form of protest accompanying each
annual report by Petitioner to your Honorable
Body of its gross receipts "on business passing through, into
or out of this State" has been as follows:
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"This company does an interstate business through, into
and out of Virginia but it has no way of ascertaining how
much of the receipts on that business is earned in Virginia.
"The business passing through, into, or out of this State
is interstate business and is not subject to taxation by the
State. It is understood that this report is intended to be used
as the basis for levjdng a tax under Section 219 of the Tax
Code of Virginia, which prescribes a license tax for the privi
lege of doing business in Virginia, and which is imposed upon
gross receipts. The $ reported as 'All Receipts
earned in Virginia on business passing through, into or out
of this stated is computed in accordance with an understand
ing had with the State Corporation Commission of Virginia,
and is made without prejudice to the protest of this Company
against any tax being levied upon, or measured by such re
ceipts. Protestant cannot, lawfully, be required to pay a li
cense tax for the privilege of doing an interstate business in
Virginia, as such tax cannot, legally, be imposed upon gross
receipts derived exclusively from interstate commerce, and
the tax if applied to interstate receipts of protestants, would
violate the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United
States, and therefore is beyond the legal authority of the State
of Virginia to levy.*'
and upon all remittances made by Petitioner of amounts paid
by it on account of license taxes so imposed against it, it has
designated the same as "Paid Under Protest" and receipts
issued to it by the Treasurer of the State of Virginia have
uniformly recited and recognized that such license fees were
"Paid Under Protest",
page 12 }■ That gross receipts in the amount of $3,090,-
916.55 were determined by your Honorable Body
to have been derived by Petitioner in the year 1950 from the
conduct of its express business in interstate commerce in the
State of Virginia, upon which a State license tax at the rate
of $2.15 per $100.00, in the aggregate amount of $66,454.71,
was assessed and imposed in the year 1951.
6. That the assessment of the aforesaid license tax in the
amount of $66,454.71 on the gross receipts derived by your
Petitioner in the year 1950 from the conduct of its express
business in interstate commerce was not made in accordance
with the terms and provisions of Section 58-547 of the Code
of Virgina, 1950 (which provide for an apportionment of total
receipts by applying a fraction the numerator of which is the
entire mileage over which such business is done and the de
nominator of which is Virginia mileage, which should, if
otherwise valid, have applied a fraction, the numerator of
10 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia '
Avliich is Virginia mileage and the denominator of which is
the entire mileage over which such business is done) and is
therefore null and void.
7. That the business of your Petitioner in the carrying of
goods, wares and merchandise in express service over the
lilies of railroad and steamship companies operating in this
State is wholly interstate in cliaracter, gross receipts derived
therefrom are not subject to taxation under and by virtue of
the laws of the State of Virginia, and the license tax annually
sought to be imposed thereon by Section 58-547 and
page 13 its antecedent sections of the Code of Virginia is
therefore unconstitutional, null and void in that it
is sought to be imposed upon the right and privilege of your
Petitioner to do an interstate express business in this State,
and constitutes a direct burden upon such commerce and a
tax upon your Petitioner for the privilege of engaging there
in, in contravention of the provisions of Article I, Section 8,
paragraph 3, of the Constitution of the United States, con
ferring upon the Congress .thereof the sole and exclusive
power to regulate commerce among the several States.
WHEREFOEE, your Petitioner respectfully prays that
tlie assessment against it by your Honorable Body of a Li
cense tax for the year 1951, in the amount of $66,454.71, may
be reviewed and corrected, and held to be invalid, null and
void, and that the said 1951 assessment may be expunged and
removed from the public I'ecords, and that the Comptroller
be directed and required to draw a warrant in favor of your
Petitioner on the Treasurer of the State of Virginia, pur
suant to the statutes of the State of Virginia in such cases
made and provided, in the amount of $66,454.71, with interest
thereon from the date of payment, in refund of the tax so paid
by petitioner.
And your Petitioner will ever pray, etc.
EAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY,
INCORPORATED
By W. A. BENSON i
Vice President.
THOMAS B. GAY
Attorney.
page 14 \ State of New York
County of New York, to-wit;
This day personally appeared before me, James F. Guyre,
a Notary Public in and for the State and County aforesaid,
Eailway Express Agencj'^, Inc. v. Commonwealth. 11
W. A. Benson, who made oath that he is a Vice President of
EAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, INCOEPOEATED, that
he has read the foregoing petition, and that the matters and
things stated therein are true to the best of his knowledge and
belief.
W. A. BENSON
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of Octo
ber, 1951.
My Commission expires: March 30, 1952.
JAklES F. GUYEE
Notarial Seal Notary Public.
James F. Guyre, Notary Public, State of New York.
Qualified in Bronx County No. 03-6711200 Certificates
filed with New York & Kings County Clerks, Bronx, N. Y.
& Kings Eegs. Offices. Term expires March 30, 1952.
page 15 J- COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION
At Richmond, July 19, 1951
APPLICATION OF RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, IN
CORPORATED, FOR CORRECTION OF ASSESS
MENT AND REFUND OF TAXES.
Case No. 10629.
On July 16, 1951, came the Eailway Express Agency, In
corporated, by Thomas B. Gay, its attorney, and presented
a petition under Section 58-1122 of the Code for the correction
of assessment and refund of taxes on gross receipts in the
amount of $70,665.68 collected from the said Eailway Express
Agency, Incoi*porated and representing a tax on its gross re
ceipts for the year 1949 and imposed in the year 1950. Ac
cordingly, it is
ORDERED:
(1) That a proceeding under Section 58-1123 of the Code
be instituted, assigned Case No. 10629, docketed and set for
hearing at 10:00 o'clock, a. m., on July 30, 1951, in the court
room of the Conunission in the State Office Building in the
City of Richmond, Virginia.
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(2) That an attested copy of this order he sent to the At
torney General of Virginia and that attested copies of this
order be sent to the attorney for the petitioner and to the Di
rector of the Division of Public Utility Taxes.
A True Copy
Teste:
N. W. ATKINSON
Clerk of the State Corporation Commission.
page 16 \ COMMONWEALTH OP VIRGINIA
STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION
At Richmond, November 8, 1951
APPLICATION OF RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, IN
CORPORATED, FOR CORRECTION OF ASSESS
MENT AND REFUND OF TAXES.
Case No. 10767.
On November 7, 1951, came the Railway Express Agency,
Incorporated, by Thomas B. Gay, its attorney, and presented
a petition for the correction of assessment and refund of taxes
in the amount of $66,454.71, collected from the said Railway
Express Agency, Incorporated, and representing a tax on its
gross receipts for the year 1950 and imposed in the year 1951.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
(1) That a proceeding be instituted, assigned Case No.
10767, docketed and set for hearing at 10:00 o'clock, a. m., on
January 22, 1952, in the courtroom of the State Corporation
Commission in the State Office Building in the City of Rich
mond, Virginia.
(2) That an attested copy of this order be sent to the At
torney General of Virginia' and that attested copies of this
order be sent to the attorney for the petitioner and to the
Director of the Division of Public Utility Taxes.
A True Copy
Teste:
N. W. ATKINSON
Clerk of the State Corporation Commission.
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Commonwealtli. 13
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STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION
APPLICATION OF RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, IN
CORPORATED, FOR REFUND OF LICENSE TAXES.
Cases Nos. 10,629 and 10,767.
Present: Commissioners H. Lester Hooker (Chairman),
W. Marshall King, Ralph T. Catterall (Presiding).
Appearances: Thomas B. Gay, H. M. Pasco, W. H. Wal-
drop, Jr., Counsel for Applicant; Henry T. Wickham, Assis
tant Attorney General, Counsel for the Commonwealth; Nor
man S. Elliott, Counsel for the Commission.
PAUL GROSS, JR.,
a witness introduced on behalf of Petitioner, being first duly
sworn, testified as follows:
*'ByMr. Gay:
Q. Will you please state your name and occupation?
A. My name is Paul Gross, Jr., and my position is that of
Assistant to Vice President, Accounting, of the
page 18 \ Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, of Vir
ginia, and Railway Express Agency, Incorporated,
the Delaware corporation."
''Q. Did Exhibit 3 in Case 10629 and Exhibit 3 in Case
10767 contain a form of protest in respect to the Company's
non-liability for license taxation in Virginia on account of the
fact that its gross earnings from interstate commerce were
not taxable in this State?
''A. They do contain such protest."
"Q. Mr. Gross, have you, at my request, prepared a state
ment showing the gross receipts reported and the State li
cense tax paid as assessed bv the Commission for the years
1931 through 1951 by the Delaware Company !
"A. I have.
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Paul Gross, Jr.
''Q. Does that statement also contain a showing of money
on deposit and taxes paid on that?
"A. It does.
''Q. And does it also show the reported value of real and
tangible propertj^ of the corporation?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And the amount of assessment of the property valued
by the Commission ?
*'A. It does.
"Q. And the tax paid to the localities?
"A. Yes.
*'Q. All for the years 1931 through 1951, inclusive?
"A. Yes."
Mr. Gay: We offer that as the next exhibit in both cases.
Commissioner Catterall: It will be received as Exhibit 6
and will be filed in Case 10767, it being understood that only
one record will be written up for both cases.
page 19 [■ ''Q. Have you also prepared, at my request, a
statement showing the same information with re
spect to the Virginia Company for the same period of time?
''A. With the exception that this statement shows the pay
ment of assessments for the years 1933 to 1951, inclusive."
Commissioner Catterall: That will be Exhibit 7 in Case
10767.
Mr. Gay:
Q. Coming back to the statement. Exhibit 6, Mr. Gross, I
notice beginning with the year 1940 and rnnning through the
year 1942, that there are two figures shown for each year,
which are explained by notation at the bottom bearing simi
lar symbols, the first in each year being amount of gross re
ceipts reported and the other amount of gross receipts as
sessed by the Commission; is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Mr. Gay: I would like to offer, if your Honors please, at
this point, a copy of a letter from Mr. H. S. Marx, then Gen
eral Counsel of the Railway Express Agency, Incorporated,
of December 10th, 1942, to Mr. J. C. Masten, First Assistant
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Paul Gross, Jr.
Assessor, with the attached memorandum, the original of
which I take to be in Mr. Hasten's files.
''Commissioner Catterall: Then it will he admitted in evi
dence as Exhibit 8.'*
"Mr. Gay:
Q. Are you familiar with the memorandum attached to Mr.
Marx's letter to Mr. Hasten, attached to the letter just filed?
A. I am.
Q. Subsequent to the date of that letter, has the Company
reported gross receipts to the Commission in conformity with
the understanding expressed therein, and has it reported such
gross receipts in accordance with that understanding, how
ever, under protest?
A. Yes.
page 20 [■ Q. I call attention to the language of Section
58-547 of the Tax Code of Virginia, to the effect
that where an express company is 'operating partly within
and partly without this State' the gross reeipts within this
State shall be deemed to be all receipts on business beginning
and ending within this State and all receipts earned in this
State on business passing through, into or out of this State',
and ask you whether the amounts of gross receipts as reported
by the Company have any relationship to the statutory for
mula?
A. They do not.
Q. Do you know what sort of formula was employed for the
purpose of determining the amount of interstate gross re
ceipts of the Delaware Company prior to 1942 ?
A. The gToss receipts were determined by applying to tlie
mileage operated in the State an arbitrary or fixed amount
to represent the gross receipts per mile.
Q. You man the mileage operated in Virginia with respect
to the System mileage ?
A. No, the miles operated in the State of Virginia by the
Express Company, to which was applied an arbitrary or fixed
amount of revenue in the sum of say $30Q or $350 per mile.
Commissioner Catterall:
Q. Mr. Gay did not read you the part of the statute that
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was in the fomula, and when you said the formula was not
followed, did you mean the formula was not followed or what
Mr. Gay read you was not followed?
A. What we did follow was the understanding reached and
referred to in the letter submitted as Exhibit No. 8. That is the
formula we followed. I understood Mr. Gay's question to be
whether that formula represented or effectively showed or
reflected the gross recipts in Virginia contemplated under the
particular section of the statute from which he has read.
Mr. Gay:
Q. As I understand you, then, the gross receipts upon which
the Company was taxed in years prior to 1942 were deter
mined by the use of some such figure as $300 or $325 per mile
of miles operated in Virginia?
A. That is correct,
page 21 }• Q. Turn, sir, a moment to Exhibit 7 and state
what the gross receipts reported in Column D of
that statement reflect?
A. The figure reported in column D of Exhibit 7 reflect the
gross reecipts reported by the Virginia Company and repre
sent the gross intrastate receipts earned by the Virginia Com
pany during the years indicated on Exhibit 7.
Q. Those are the actual gross receipts?
A. Yes. j ;
Q. From intrastate commerce?
A. That is correct. ii > '
CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Wickham:
''Q. You have testified to the fact that the Delaware Com
pany has always filed under protest, or paid under protest
rather, their so-called 'license taxes' based on gross receipts.
Do you know whether or not the Delaware Company has, pre
vious to these cases, filed any petitions for refunds for such
taxes?
"A. I do not know of it.
"Q. Do you have any knowledge of any such petitions hav
ing been filed ?
"A. No, I do not.
"Q. In your position as Assistant to the Vice President, if
any petitions were filed, would you not be aware of them ?
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"A. If petitions were filed and the Accounting Department
had been directly interested in the proceeding, we would be
notified of it, yes.
''Q. You were aware that the petitions filed in this case
were contemplated?
''A. As a matter of fact, I was not."
Commissioner Catterall:
Q. If any petitions in the past had been granted, would they
have come to your attention?
A. They would.
Q. Has any information upon that come to your attention?
A. They did not come to my personal atten-
page 22 }■ tion.
Mr. Wickham:
Q. Referring to the exhibit, the letter of the Delaware Com
pany, and also the formula prescribed and set up in order to
arrive at the proper tax on gross receipts, the Delaware Com
pany agreed to this formula, did they not I
A. I would not term the memorandum 'an agreement.' I
think it is an understanding reached between Mr. Marx, the
writer of the letter, and Mr. Masten, outlining what the Dela
ware Company would report as to gross receipts for the year
in question.
Q. The Delaware Company made no objection or protest
to this formula on this point?
A. Except that the reports were filed in protest.
Q. But there was no objection to this formula as to the ac
tual taxes to be paid?
A. I do not know of any except that they were filed with
the protest attached and the drafts issued with protest at
tached, and the receipts were acknowledged 'paid' as having
been received under protest."
"Q, Does the Delaware Company have any agreement with
the railroads as to operating lines?
"A. The Railway Express Company, the Delaware Com
pany, conducts the express transportation business over the
lines of all railroads in the Counti-y and the principal lines
under the so-called 'Standard Agreement' or the 'Express
Operations Agreement', which became effective in March,
1939.
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''Q. That 'Standard Agreement* is between the railroads
and the Delaware Company?
"A. Yes."
CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Elliott:
Q. The Delaware Company is owned by the railroads, as I
understand it?
A. It is, the principal railroads. There are 68 stockholders.
Q. And any money which the Delaware Company earns
over and above its expenses is paid to the railroads in the
form of compensation for performing their part of the serv
ice?
A. That is correct. In the Accounting Classification, the
account to which we charge off payments is desig-
page 23 [■ nated 'Express Privileges' and has been in the ac
counts of the Interstate Commerce Commission
many years.
Q. What securities does the Delaware Company have out
standing, or did it have in 1951 ?
A. In 1951, it had the one thousand shares of stock issued
to the stockholders of the Railway Express Company. That
is all.
Q. Does it have any other forms of debts or securities ?
A. It does not.
Q. How does it raise its capital to do business?
A. The capital to do business was raised in 1929, or there
abouts, through the issuance of bonds in the sum of $32,000,-
000.
Q. Those bonds have ben retired and there are no securi
ties outstanding other than the capital stock you referred to;
is that not correct ?
A. That is correct.
i  RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION.
"By Mr. Gay:
Q. You referred to the fact that the Delaware Company had
a thousand shares of stock issued and outstanding and that
it was issued to the railroads that own the property. Was
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that stock issue liad and the $32,000,000 of bonds issued listed
issued in Finance Docket No. 7322?
A. They were approved by the Commission in that docket.
Q. Without going into the details, does the opinion in that
case, Mr. Gross, recite historically the ownership and opera
tion of the Express Company in America?
A. Very completely.
Mr. Gay: We don't want to file the opinion but we rely on
the findings of the Commission in Finance Docket 7322, re
ported in 1501. C. C. at page 423, decision rendered February
11,1929.
Commissioner Catterall: You will give us all of those
references.
Mr. Gay: Yes, we will.
page 24 \ Mr. Gay:
Q. You stated those bonds had all been paid off,
that is the $32,000,000, under the Interstate Commerce Com
mission order?
A. That is correct.
Q. Who paid them off?
A. The bonds were liquidated by contributions of cash made
by the railroad companies to retire the bonds as and when
they came due.
Q. So they were not paid out of the earnings of the Dela
ware Company?
A. Oh, no.
Q. How is this advance made by the railroads, to go a lit
tle further into that, although it may not be material, carried
on the books of the Delaware Company, that is the advance
made to pay off the bonds ?
A. As indicated by the Balance Sheet of the Delaware Com
pany, included in the annual information returns filed with
the Interstate Commerce Commission and filed also with this
Commission as of December 31st, 1950, the amount of the ad
vances made by the stockholders to liquidate the bonds ap
pear in Account 530, designated as 'Funded Debt Unsecured',
in the sum of $28,608,570.
Q. The substance of that matter is that, instead of the pub
lic holding this $32,000,000 issue, as authorized by the Inter
state Commerce Commission, at the date or when this was
prescribed, that was paid off to the public and is now owed
to the railroads?
A. That is correct."
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STIPULATION OF COUNSEL AS TO RECORD
ON APPEAL.
It is stipulated by counsel for all parties:
1. Cases Nos. 10,629 and 10,767 having been heard together,
only one record on appeal shall be made up and certified for
both cases.
2. In Case No. 10,629 the tax was assesed pursuant to Sec
tion 58-547 of the Code in the amount of $70,665.68,
page 25 }■ the certified copy of the assessment therefor was
received by the Petitioner on August 17, 1950, and
the tax in the amount assessed was paid by the Petitioner to
the Treasurer of Virginia on September 15, 1950, under the
following protest:
''RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, INCORPORATED
(A DELAWARE CORPORATION)
"This company does an interstate business through, into,
and out of Virginia but it has no way of ascertaining how
much of the receipts on that business is earned in Virginia. .
"The business passing through, into, or out of ttii^ State
is interstate business and is not subject to taxation by the
State. It is understood that this report is intended to be used
as the basis for levying a tax under Section 58-547 oi the Code
of Virgina, which prescribes a license tax for the privilege
of doing business in Virgina, and which is imposed upon gross
pceipts. The $3,286,775.70 reported.as 'All Receipts earned
in Virgina on business passing through, into or out of this
State,'is computed in accordance with an understanding had
with the Ktaie Uorporatlon Commission of Virginia, aM
.made witnout oreiudice to the protest ot tnis rfennanv
against any tax being levied tipon, or measured bv such re
ceipts^ Protestants cannot, lawtuliv. be required to nav a ii-
cense tax for tlie privilege of doing an interstate Ibusiness in
Virginia, as such tax cannot, legally, be imposed upon gross
receipts derived exclusively from interstate commerce, and
the tax applied to the interstate receipts of protestant, would
violate the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United
States, and therefore is beyond the legal authority of the
State of Virginia to levy."
3. In Case No. 10,767 the tax was assessed pursuant to Sec
tion 58-547 of the Code in the amount of $66,454.71, the certi
fied copy of the assessment therefor was received by the Peti
tioner on August 18, 1951, and the tax in the amount assessed
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was paid by the Petitioner to the Treasurer of Virginia on
September 25, 1951, under the same protest under which the
tax assessed for 1950 was paid.
4. Since the Commonwealth admits and the Coromission
has found that the taxpaper does no intrastate business in
Virginia, the testimony and exhibits relating to ^ at issue are
not material on this appeal,
page 26 [- 5. The record on appeal shall consist only of the
petitions in both cases, the foregoing testimony of
Paul Gross, Jr., Exhibits 6, 7, 8 in Case No. 10,767, the orders
entered by the Commission, the opinion of the Commission,
and this stipulation.
H. MERRILL PASCO
Counsel for Applicant.
HENRY T. WICKHAM
Assistant Attorney General
of Virginia.
NORMAN S. ELLIOTT
Counsel for the Commission.
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STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION
At Richmond, June 16,1952
APPLICATION OF RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, IN
CORPORATED, FOR CORRECTION OF ASSESS
MENT AND REFUND OF TAXES.
Case No. 10629.
ON MARCH 19, 1952, came again the applicant. Railway
Express Agency, Incorporated, by Thomas B. Gay, H. Merrill
Pasco and W. H. Walclrop, Jr., its attorneys, and came also
the Commonwealth, by Henry T. Wickham, Assistant Attor
ney General, and the State Corporation Commission, by Nor
man S. Elliott, its Counsel; and the Commission having heard
all of the evidence, continued this case to permit counsel for
the applicant and the Commonwealth to submit briefs.
NOW ON THIS DAY, briefs having been filed by the
parties, and the Commission, having considered the evidence
and briefs submitted by counsel, is of the opinion and finds.
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for reasons stated in an opinion filed this day in this ease
and Case No. 10767, by Catterall, Commissioner, and con
curred in by Hooker, Chairman, and King, Commissioner,
that the petition herein was filed too late under Section 58-
672 of the Code of Virginia of 1950, and the Commission has
no jurisdiction to grant the relief requested.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:
(1) That the application of Railway Express Agency, In
corporated, for correction of assessment and refund of taxes
for the year 1950, as set forth in its application, filed herein,
be dismissed, because the Commission is without jurisdiction
to pass upon said application and grant the relief requested,
and that this proceeding be dropped from the docket; and
(2) That attested copies hereof, together with copies of
the Commission's opinion referred to herein, be sent to coun
sel for the applicant, and to the Attorney General of the Com
monwealth.
A True Copy
Teste:
N. W. ATKINSON
Clerk of the State Corporation Commission.
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At Richmond, June 16, 1952
APPLICATION OF RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, IN
CORPORATED, FOR CORRECTION OF ASSESS
MENT AND REFUND OF TAXES.
Case No. 10767
ON MARCH 19, 1952, came again the applicant. Railway
Express Agency, Incorporated, by Thomas B. Gay, H. Merrill
Pasco and W. H. Waldrop, Jr., its attorneys, and came also
the Commonwealth, by Henry T. Wickham, Assistant Attor
ney General, and the State Corporation Commission, by Nor
man S. Elliott, its Counsel; and the Commission having heard
all of the evidence, continued this case to permit counsel for
the applicant and the Commonwealth to submit briefs.
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NOW ON THIS DAY, briefs having been filed by the
parties, and the Commission, having considered the evidence
and the briefs submitted by counsel, is of the opinion and finds,
for reasons stated in an opinion this day filed in this case and
in Case No. 10629, by Catterall, Commissioner, and concurred
ill by Hooker, Chairman, and King, Commissioner, that the
relief requested in the application filed herein should be
denied.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:
(1) That the application of Railway Express Agency, In
corporated, for correction of assessment and refund of taxes
for the year 1951, be denied, and this proceeding be dropped
from the docket; and
(2) That attested copies hereof, together with copies of the
opinion referred to herein, be sent to counsel for the appli
cant and to the Attorney General of the Commonwealth.
A True Copy
Teste :
N. W. ATKINSON
Clerk of the State Corporation Commission.
page 29 )■ OPINION—CATTERALL, COMMISSIONER.
Railway Express Agency, Incorporated is a Delaware cor
poration, and Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, of Vir
ginia, is a Virginia corporation. The Delaware corporation
owns the stock of the Virginia corporation and since March
12, 1932, the Virginia corporation has carried on the intra-
state express business in Virginia.
Since the creation of the Virginia company, both companies
have paid the annual license tax imposed by §58-547 of the
Code, but the Delaware company has taken the position that
the tax on it violates the commerce clause of the federal con
stitution. In 1930 (before the creation of the Virginia com
pany) it raised this question in a petition to the State Cor
poration Commission. The Commission held the tax consti
tutional but reduced the amount of the tax measured by gross
receipts from interstate business by about $41,000.
page 30 \ Annual Report 1933, p. 9. The company did not
appeal from that order, hut for many years it has
paid its taxes under protest, and, when the Supreme Court
of the United States on March 26, 1951, rendered its decision
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in Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U. S. 602, the com
pany was encouraged to try again to upset the tax.
By that time, more than three months had elapsed since
it had received the certified copy of the assessment for 1950,
and it was too late to apply for a refund under <^58-672. It ap
plied under §58-1122. The petition in the second case (for
1951) was filed within the three month's period.
In Case No. 10,629 we have to decide whether we have juris
diction to entertain the petition, or whether the petition was
filed too late. On the constitutional question, the issues in
both cases are, of course, the same; and both cases were heard
together.
The question of jurisdiction in Case No. 10,629.
We have come to the conclusion that the petition in Case
No. 10,629 was filed too late and that the Commission has no
jurisdiction to pass on it.
Title 58 of the Code covers the subject of taxation and
Chapter 12 of that title deals with the taxation of public serv
ice corporations, although the chapter includes some tax
payers that are not corporations and some corporations that
are not public service companies,
page 31 } Article 4 of that Chapter imposes the taxes on
express companies and Article 16 covers the sub
ject of erroneous assessments. All references in this opinion
to "articles" will refer to articles in Chapter 12 of Title 58.
Article 16, in §58-672, provides for relief from erroneous
assessments on "any transportation company, transmission
company or other public service corporation."
As used in the constitution and laws of Virginia, "trans
portation conipany" is a word of art that does not have its
ordinary dictionary meaning. For example, a common car
rier by motor vehicle is not a transportation company. An
express company is a transportation company.
Sec. 153 of the constitution says:
"# ♦ # * transportation company' shall include
any * • * express company * *
Therefore, the petitioner is included in Article 16 as spe
cifically as if Article 16 used the words "express company;"
and Article 16 is a specific law under which express companies
may apply for relief froni erroneous assessments made by the
State Corporation Commission.
Section 58-1122, on which petitioner relies, is a general stat
ute for the correction of taxes assessed by the State Corpora-
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tioii Commission, and it allows a petition to be filed at any
time within one year after the tax complained of has been
paid. The words to be construed are:
***** unless and except as otherwise specifically pro
vided * * *."
page 32 }■ Section 58-1122 provides a catchall for cases not
otherwise specifically provided for. It gives rights
of review to individuals as well as corporations and to cor
porations that are not public service corporations. Our in
terpretation of the legislative intent is that a petition that
can be filed under Article 16 cannot be filed under §58-1122.
So far as we know, the question now raised by petitioner has
never been raised before. In the past, all petitions that could
be filed under Article 16 were filed under that article.
The petition filed by petitioner in Case No. 4037, reported
in our 1933 Annual Report at page 9, was filed under Section
235 of the Tax Code (Acts of 1928, p. 164), which is the source
of Article 16. Proceeding under that section, petitioner got
a refund of over $40,000, and yet the burden of petitioner's
argument seems to be that that section does not relate to re
fund claims. At page 11 of its brief, petitioner says:
**But there are not any other specific statutory provisions
relating to the refund of license taxes paid hy express com
panies."
At page 12 of its brief, petitioner says:
** Section 58-672 * • * does not specifically provide for a
claim for refund of taxes already paid.'*
Section 58-672 does not use the word '*refund." It uses
the words **review and correction." The only way to correct
an assessment that has been paid is to refund the
page 33 }■ money, and Article 16, in §58-675 expressly pro
vides for the refund of taxes already paid. It
says:
***** appropriate relief shall be granted, including the
right to recover from the State or local authorities, or both,
as the case may be, any excess of taxes that may have been
paid. The order of the Commission shall be enforced by man
damus, or other proper process, issuing from the Commis
sion. ''
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The writ of mandamus is a common law writ to compel a
public officer to perform a ministerial duty. It does not issue
to compel a private corporation to pay a tax, but does issue
to compel a public officer or municipal corporation to refund
a tax. Article 16 is a specific statute providing a complete
remedy at law pursuant to which express companies can apply
for and get refunds.
Petitioner arg-ues that this remedy is not specifically pro
vided for express companies because Article 16 does not con
tain the words express companies." And it points to §58-
540 in Article 2 which mentions railway and canal companies
and to §58-616 in Article 10 which mentions water or heat,
light and power companies.
Section 58-540, relating specifically to railways and canals,
and "^58-616, relating specifically to water or heat, light and
power companies, relate solely to relief in the Circuit Court
of the City of Richmond. Neither section provides for relief
on application to the State Corporation Commission, and both
are unconstitutional. §58-540 conflicts with Sec.
page 34 [• 180 of the Constitution which provides that a rail
way or canal company "may, according to such
course of procedure as may be prescribed by law, apply for
relief first to the State Corporation Commission and then to
the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond.'' §58-616 conflicts
\vith Sec. 156(d) of the Constitution which forbids any cir
cuit court to "review, reverse, correct or annul any action of
the Commission, within the scope of its authority."
Article 16 covers "any transportation company, transmis
sion company or other public service corporation." There
fore railway and canal companies, and water or heat, light
and power companies can seek relief under Article 16. §58-
676 (in Article 16) provides that all of them, after review by
the Commission, can go to the Circuit Court of the City of
Richmond. That provision appears to be unconstitutional as
to all except railway and canal companies (Const. Sec. 180).
§58-677 (in Article 16) provides that all parties may go to
the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond "for relief from
any original assessment without having first applied to the
Commission for a review thereof." That section appears to
be inconsistent with Sec. 156(d) of the Constitution.
Accordingly, railway, canal, water, heat, light, power and
express companies are all specifically provided for in Article
16. All may petition under Article 16 and all must petition
under Article 16. The argument based on the fact
page 35 [■ that express companies are not mentioned by name
in Article 16 applies equally to all the others, be
cause none of them is there specifically mentioned by name.
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A statute that applies specifically to all transportation com
panies applies specifically to every transportation company.
In legislating for a class, the legislature does not have to
name every member of the class in order to make the law
apply specifically to every member of the class. The class to
which Article 16 applies consists of public service companies
whose real estate and tangible property are assessed by the
Commission, whose state franchise or license taxes are as
sessed by the Commission, and to whom the Clerk of the Com
mission is required by law to forward a certified copy of the
assessment. The three months begins to run "after receiv
ing a certified copy of such assessment of value or tax." The
taxpayer has actual notice of the assessment before time be
gins to run against him.
Such taxes are assessed by the Commission after giving the
taxpayers thirty days' notice that the assessment is to be
made. See the following sections:
Railway and canal. §58-529
Express companies , §58-549
Freight car companies , §58-558
Sleeping cars ! §58-566
Steamship lines I §58-582
page 36 Pipe lines , §58-590
Water, heat, light & power §58-610
City bus lines §58-647
The notice specifies the date when a hearing will be held on
the assessments in the courtroom of the Commission. Each
taxpayer is given an opportunity to be heard. After the hear
ing the taxes are assessed by order of the Commission and
copies of the assessments are printed and sent to the State
Comptroller and to every city, town and country, and to each
taxpayer. The sections of the Code relating to the certifica
tion of these assessments by the Clerk of the Commission are:
To Comptroller To cities, towns
and taxpayer and counties
Railroads §58-530 §58-538
Express companies §58-550 §58-551
Freight cars §58-559 None
Sleeping ears §58-567 None
Steamships §58-572 §58-573
Tel. & tel. §58-583 §58-584 >
Pipe lines §58-590 §58-592
Water, etc. §58-611 §58-612
City bus §58-648 §58-650
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Taxpayers falling in this class are thus notified in advance
of the assessment that is about to be made, and
page 37 [• each taxpayer receives an invitation to state his
objections to the assessment before it is made.
After the assessments have been made and printed copies are
certified to all the interested parties. Article 16 then gives
each taxpayer three months in which to file a petition for a
review and correction of any item that he takes exception to.
Article 16 provides the specific method for review and cor
rection of the taxes thus assessed.
Petitioner bases two arguments on the wording of §58-1122
on the mistaken assumptions (1) that the Commission as
sesses license taxes only against public service companies,
and (2) that if the res judicata clause in §58-1122 does not
apply to proceedings under §58-672, there is nothing else for
it to apply to.
1. The first of these arguments is stated on page 10 of pe
titioner's brief:
"The General Assembly must have intended for at least
some corporations to have a right to claim a refund of license
taxes under Section 58-1122; otherwise that part of the stat
ute would be meaningless and presumably would not have
been adopted by the General Assembly. Since the Commis
sion assesses those taxes only against public service corpora
tions it is apparent that the relief granted to such corpora
tions by Section 58-672 cannot be exclusive."
The Commission assesses many taxes beside public service
company taxes. Some of these taxes are called license taxes
and are license taxes; others are not called license taxes and
are license taxes,
page 38 [• For example, the taxes imposed by Articles 12
and 13 are called "road taxes" and are license
taxes. If a motor carrier fails to pay these taxes, we revoke
his privilege to use the highways.
The taxes imposed on insurance companies by §58-486 are
<?alled license taxes and are license taxes. They are assessed
by the Commission under §58-497. If they are not paid, the
Commission revokes the taxpayer's license to do business
(§68-498).
These are examples of taxpayers who can claim refunds
under §58-1122.
The so-called "license" taxes imposed on express com
panies are the same kind of taxes as the "franchise" taxes
imposed on railroads. Neither of them is a license tax, be-
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cause neither is exacted as a condition of carrying on the busi
ness. A license tax is an excise tax that must be paid as a
condition of carrying on a business or exercising a privilege.
2. The second of these arguments is stated on page 12 of
petitioner's brief:
"Section 58-1122 provides that a refund of tax cannot be
obtained 'after a formal adjudication in a proceeding in which
the right of appeal existed and was not taken.' The quoted
language must refer to a proceeding that could be brought
under a section other than Section 58-1122 in which the de
cision was against the taxpayer; * *
The quoted language is merely a statement of the doctrine
of res judicata. Many taxes assessed by the Com-
page 39 }■ mission are certified to the Comptroller for collec
tion. If such a tax is not paid, the Comptroller
causes suit to be brought against the delinquent taxpayer. If
the decision in that suit is against the taxpayer, he obviously
cannot pay the tax and thereafter apply for a refund. The
same principle apphes to cases in which the Commission im
poses penalties on taxpayers under §58-635 and 58-642. If
the penalty is imposed for failure to pay taxes, it would be a
bar to an application for a refund of the same taxes. All de
cisions of the State Corporation Commission can be appealed.
Case No. 10,629 must be dismissed because the petition was
not filed in time. We turn now to the constitutional question
that is properly raised in Case No. 10,767.
The Constitutional Question.
This case is governed by Commonwealth v. Baltimore
Steam Packet Co., 193 Va. 55, appeal dismissed, 96 L. ed. Adv.
Ops. 578 (April 21, 1952).
Article 7, taxing steamship companies, and Article 4, tax
ing express companies, are so much alike that no distinction
can be drawn between them. Petitioner, realizing that the
decision of that case would control this case, filed a brief
amicus curiae in that case. In that brief, petitioner said (p.
2):
"In view of the importance of the Court's ruling, both to
the Appellees and to many other corporations op-
page 40 }• erating in Virginia either entirely or partly in in
terstate commerce. Railway Express thought it in
the public interest that this Court should have before it a full
presentation of its viewpoint on the problems involved. "
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The Supreme Court of Appeals, at page 68 of its opinion
said:
''In the case of steamship companies (and also express
companies) the tax is denominated a license tax, and the re
quirement is that every such company shall pay it 'for the
privilege of doing business in this State, in addition to the an
nual registration fee and property tax.' But what it is called
is not necessarily what it is.''
Except for poll taxes, all taxes are either excise taxes or
property taxes. The reason it is necessary to decide whether
"a particular tax is an excise tax or a property tax is because
of constitutional limitations. The constitution of the United
States, for example, provides, in effect, that all federal taxes
on property must be apportioned among the several states in
accordance with their respective populations, and that all fed
eral excise taxes must not be so apportioned, but must be uni
formly applied throughout the United States. Accordingly,
the constitutionality of every federal tax depends on whether
it is an excise tax or a property tax. Beginning with Hylton
V. United States, 1 L. ed. 556 in 1796, nearly every federal tax
has been contested in the Supreme Court on the ground that
it was not properly apportioned or was not properly uniform.
In the great case of Pollock v. Farmers Loam <& Trust Co.,
158 U. S. 601, 39 L. ed. 759 (1895) the court held,
page 41 ]■ five to four, that a general income tax was a prop
erty tax as to income from property and an excise
tax as to income from earnings. That decision was reversed
in 1913 by the 16th Amendment, and has never commanded
universal respect. The Court of Appeals of Virginia refused
to follow it in 1936 in Hunton v. Commonwealth, 166 Va. 229.
Beginning with decisions rendered by Chief Justice Mar
shall the Supreme Court has held that the commerce clause,
which says that Congress shall have power to regulate inter
state commerce, means that the states are forbidden to regu
late interstate commerce. Since those decisions are based
more on considerations of policy than of logic, tliey cannot
be carried to a strictly logical conclusion; and ever since
Cooley V. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299,13 L. ed. 996 (1851),
it has been recognized that the states are free to regnilate some
parts of interstate commerce, namly those parts that the Su
preme Court thinks it desirable that the states should be free
to reg-ulate. Proceeding from the field of regulation to the
field of taxation, the Supreme Court has decided that a state
tax on interstate commerce is a state regulation of interstate
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commerce and is void if-it goes too far. It is interesting to
look at tlie actual wordsof me constitution and then contem
plate the edifice the court has built on them.
Those words are:
"The Congress shall have Power * * * To regulate Com
merce with foreign Nations, and among the sev-
page 42 }• eral States, and with the Indian Tribes; * *
"With only those words to guide it the court has struck down
countless state taxes on the ground that they impede the free
flow of commerce more than they should, and has upheld
countless state taxes on the principle that "interstate com
merce must pay its way.'*
In this field of constitutional law the court itself, without
any words in the constitution expressing or implying any such
distinction, has drawn a line between excise taxes and prop
erty taxes. If the tax is an excise tax, the court may or may
not strike it down, but if the tax is a property tax all is well:
state taxes on property used in interstate commerce are up
held so long as the property is located in the taxing state.
State property taxes that get bv the due process clause do not
run into trouble with the commerce clause.
So, when the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that
the license taxes on steamship and express companies were
propeHy taxes.''all~danSi:' of an advprafi-daci&iQn in thp
preme Court oiThe TTnit.efl Stateswas averted, and that court
dismissed the appeal ^nTmnpnt, presnmahly nu the
ground that no federal question worth fliscusaing was in
volved. In UommomvealthY. Battimore Steam Packet Co.,
193 Va. 55, the court said (p. 70):
"Likewise, in the 1941 Annual Report of the Commission,
page 41, it was said:
page 43 }■ " 'Therefore, in making the assessment of the
physical properties, we are assessing the tracks,
track structures, cuts, fills, tunnels, bridges, and the like, or,
in other words, the bare bones of the property denuded of the
intangible elements of value which may be attributable to
them. It should also be borne in mind that the franchise value
is assessed at 100%.'
"It thus appears that the physical properties of these ap
pellees, according to this practice, were assessed on the basis
of their dual values, the dead value, or 'the hare bones,' to
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be taxed by the locality, and the live, or going concern value,
to be taxed by the State for the protection and services ren
dered by it. That the going concern value is thus taxable,
although the basic items of property on which it arises are
used in interstate commerce, is established by numerous de
cisions^ of the Supreme Court, as set out above. This tax on
the going concern value is in effect an increase of the ad
valorem rate, Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, supra. In
its derivation and substance it is a tax on an element of value
of the physical properties not reached by the tax levied by the
localities, but reserved to the State and not otherwise taxed.
It is, therefore, a tax which is not prohibited by the Commerce
Clause."
Commenting on this decision, the April, 1952, Virginia Law
Review at page 423 remarks:
''It appears that the Court in the instant case preferred
to sustain the tax on the ground that it was an ad valorem tax
rather than on the ground that it was a privilege tax on a
business not exclusively interstate in character. If the mental
gymnastics employed by the Court are questioned, it may
only be answered that this is not the first time such an ap
proach to the problem has ben used. If the Spector case is
an indication of a return to the 'direct-indirect' test as to
state taxation of interstate commerce, then the Court was
wise in its choice of grounds."
We deprecate this suggestion that our highest court en
gaged in "mental gymnastics" to get around the
page 44 Spector case. Long before the Spector case was
heard of the franchise or license taxes on public
service companies were regarded as property taxes.
Sec. 170 of the constitution provides:
"The General Assembly * * * may impose State franchise
taxes, and in imposing a franchise tax may, in its discretion,
make the same in lieu of taxes upon other property/, in whole
or in part, of a transportation, industrial or commercial cor
poration."
If the framers of the constitution had not regarded fran
chise taxes as taxes on property, they could not have used
the words other property."
(§58-553 makes the express company tax in lieu of other
taxes. By virtue of that section express companies escape
the tax on their rolling stock).
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The franchise or license taxes imposed on public service
companies are taxes on intangible property.
In Commonwealth v. Baltimore Steam Packet Co., 193 Va.
55 at page 69 the court said:
"We said in that opinion that the existing method of as
sessing the properties of the utility involved in that case was
developed from the system prescribed for the assessment of
railroad properties, and we quoted from a letter relating to
railroad assessments written by Commissioner Epes, after
wards a justice of this court, saying in part:
' "The value of these physical properties, which the Com
mission has tried to ascertain as the 100% basis to which to
relate its assessments, is the actual value as of January 1,
1927, of the land and other physical properties of
page 45 [■ the railroad company exclusive of any franchise
value, good will, "going concern value," "cost of
establishing the business," or other "intangible" value of
the company." ' "
An express company with a nation-wide monopoly enjoys
valuable good will. The going concern value of its property
greatly exceeds the value of its real estate and trucks. And
that going concern value is of course intangible property.
The nature of that property has been described by the Su
preme Court in Adams Express Company v. Ohio, 166 U. S.
185, 41 L. ed. 965 (1897) as follows:
"But this contention practically ignores the existence of
intangible property, or at least denies its liability for tax
ation. In the complex civilization of today a large portion
of the wealth of a community consists in intangible property,
and there is nothing in the nature of things or in the limita
tions of the Federal Constitution which restrains a state from
taxing at its real value such intangible property."
"The first question to be considered therefore is whether
there is belonging to these express companies intangible prop
erty—property differing from the tangible property—a
property created by either the combined use or the manner of
use of tine separate articles of tangible property, or the grant
or acquisition of franchises or privileges, or all together. To
say that there can be no such intangible property, that it is
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something of no value, is to insult the common intelligence of
every man."
"But where is the situs of this intangible property? The
Adams Express Company has, according to its showing, in
round numbers $4,000,000 of tangible property scattered
through different states, and with that tangible
page 46 }► property thus scattered transacts its business. By
the business which it transacts, by combining into
a single use all these separate pieces and articles of tangible
property, by the contracts, franchises, and privileges which
it has acquired and possesses, it has created a corporate prop
erty of the actual vnlue of $16,000,000. Thus, according to
its figures, this intangible property, its franchises, privileges,
etc., is of the value of $12,000,000 and its tangible property
of only $4,000,000. Where is the situs of this intangible prop
erty? Is it simply where its home office is, where is found
the central directing thought which controls the workings of
the great machine, or in the state which gave it its corporate
franchise; or is that intangible property distributed wherever
its tangible property is located and its work is done? Clearly,
as we think, the latter.''
At the 1952 session of the General Assembly, Article 7, im
posing taxes on steamship carriers, was rewritten; and pe
titioner argues that the amendment amounts to a legislative
declaration that the Supreme Court of Appeals had misin
terpreted the intent of the legislature. At page 27 of its brief
petitioner says:
"Applicant is of course aware of the decision of the Su
preme Court of Appeals in the Baltimore Steam Packet Com
pany case, supra, that a quite similar tax on steamship and
other water carriers was not a privilege tax but a property
tax on the going concern value of such companies. This
Honorable Commission would undoubtedly be bound by that
decision in applying the statute to any other steamship com
pany, except for the action of the General Assembly at its
1952 Session in amending the gross reecipts tax on such com
panies (Sec. 58-575 of the Code of Virginia) so as to provide
that such tax should applv only to gross receipts derived from
intrastate commerce in Virginia. The effect of this amend-
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ment is to nullify at the earliest opportunity the decision of
the Court of Appeals in the Baltimore Steam Packet Company
case and clearly establishes the legislative intent that the tax
there involved was never intended to apply to gross
page 47 [• receipts earned from interstate commerce. Ap
plicant therefore respectfully submits that the ac
tion of the General Assembly in amending Section 58-575 of
the Code of Virginia (subsequent to and in the light of the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeals in the Bdtimore
Steam Packet case) definitely establishes the nature of that
tax to be a privilege tax, rather than a property tax. The tax
on express companies under consideration here is so similar
as to be subject to the same interpretation.^'
This argument about legislative "intent," when broken
down into its component parts, asserts three things:
1. The legislature wanted to "nullify" the court's decision.
The word "nullify" is used to create the impression that the
legislature was trying to wipe the decision off the books
retroactively.
2. The tax was "never intended to applj'" to gross receipts
from interstate commerce." This is saying that the legis
lature amended the law for the purpose of changing its mean
ing retroactively. The argument asserts that although the
statute expressly covered interstate commerce, the legislature
never intended it to cover interstate commerce.
3. The legislature, having learned that the tax is constitu
tional because it is a property tax, quickly amended the law
for the purpose of expressing its desire that the Court of
Appeals hold unconstitutional the tax on express companies.
Of course, in seeking the "intent of the legislature", we
are not looking for what was in the back of the minds of the
legislators. The intent of the legislature must be
l^age 48 [■ found in the words used by the legislature, and the
object of interpretation is to discover the meaning
of those words.
The words in question are:
" * * * all receipts on business beginning and ending within
this State and all receipts earned in this State on business
passing through, into or out of this State * * *."
Petitioner asks us to hold that the General Assembly, by
amending the statute in 1952, intended to say that its words
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''business passing througb, into or out of this State" were
never intended to describe anything but intrastate movement.
Such an interpretation is impossible.
Petitioner asks us to hold that the 1952 amendment was in
tended to be retroactive and to "nullify" the decision of the
Court of Appeals. If the decision were really nullified, it
could not be enforced, and the steamship companies would
not have to pay the 1950 and 1951 taxes. But the new statute
(Chapter 486, Acts of 1952) concludes:
"These sections as amended shall go into effect as of the
beginning of the first day of January, nineteen hundred fifty-
three." .
Not only has the legislature not nullified the 1950 and 1951
assessments: it has declared that the taxes shall be assessed
for 1952, and has thereby expressed its agreement with the
r ^urt that the tax measured b-^' interstate earnings is valid.
pThis amendment was not adopted for the purpose of ex
pressing disapproval of the court's interpretation
ge 49 [• of the law but for the purpose of encouraging
navigation in the great port of Hampton Roads.
That was a subject prominently before the 1952 General As
sembly TliP Ipp-ifilature toured TTflmp|nTi in n bnrly
and Passed a lu^w (Chap. t)'l. Acts of 19521 to create^^^^ir-
1 steamshi|
witn the vear 1953. Since the CnnrfoT'Appftflls bad
^hat the license tax imposed by ^ 58-575 was not a privilege
the General Aiisemoly, wnen it amended §58-5Vo, left out
the word "privilege" for the purpose of making it clear that
it agreed with the holding of the court that these taxes are
not in fact privilege taxes. Petitioner's argument that we
should now hold that the legislature was trying to make un
constitutional the franchise and license taxes on which so
large a part of the state's revenue depends is as topsy-turvy
as the upside-down fraction in the apportionment formula.
Unquestionably, the fraction described in §58-575 for steam
ship lines and in §58-547 for express companies is upside
down. Many people find it confusing to describe ratios and
this mistake is not uncommon. However, it is clear in both
sections that the legislature meant to tax only a part of the
total gross receipts. The legislature could not have intended
to tax wore than the total gross I'eceipts. If one-tenth of the
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gross receipts were earned in Virginia, the legis-
page 50 \ lature intended to measure the tax by one-tenth of
the gross receipts and not hy ten times the gross
receipts. The language of the steamship company fraction
is more defective than that of the express company fraction.
^575 uses the words:
II* # * that proportion of the total receipts ***.'»
§58-547 uses the words:
(<* » » portion of the total receipts * * * If
Thus, the express company fonnula contains within itself
a word stating the intent of the legislature to tax only a por
tion of the gTOss receipts.
The actual measure of the tax is stated in ^ 58-547:
"When such companies are operating partly within and
partly without this State, the gross receipts within this State
shall be deemed to be all receipts on business beginning and
ending within this State and all receipts earned in this State
on business passing through, into or out of this State j * * *'»
The proviso:
"* * * unless otherwise clearly shown, such last-mentioned
receipts shall be deemed to he that portion of the total re
ceipts * *
merely points out a method of computing the amount of re
ceipts earned in Virginia. The taxing statute is complete in
itself without the proviso, and the proviso itself directs that
the formula he not used if it be clearly shown that application
of the formula Avould result in taxing receipts that could not
properly he deemed to have been earned within the State.
Heretofore, the Commission has acquiesced in
page 51 the view that, because the density of express traffic
is greater in other parts of the country than in
Virginia, it would not be fair to the company to employ tJie
formula based on mileage. In recent years the Commission
and the company have by mutual agreement employed a rough
and ready fonnula that, because of changing conditions, is
getting out of line and will have to be revised. The statutory
formula (with the fraction turned right side up) produces
the maximum tax, the fonnula under which the tax complained
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of was assessed produces the minimum tax, and the correct
measure of j-eceipts actually earned within the State lies
somewhere between the two. The taxpaj'^er cannot be heard
to complain that the tax is too low.
The Specter case does not invalidate any property taxes
but only some excise taxes. Since the tax complained of is a
property tax and not an excise tax, it is unnecessary to decide
whether the Delaware corporation is doing an intrastate busi
ness in Virginia through the agency or instrumentality of the
Virginia corporation.
A corporation is an imaginary person created under and
by virtue of a statute that gives it eternal life and its stock
holders limited liability. The command of the statute is that
this fictitious creature shall be treated as if it were real.
When courts, as they frecjuently do, ignore the corporate en
tity in order to achieve justice, they necessarily
page 52 [■ ignore the words of the statute creating the cor
poration, on the theory that the legislature could
not have intended the corporate fiction to be used for a wrong
ful purpose. The Viiginia Court of Appeals, in Beale v.
Kappa Alpha, 1&2 Va. 382 at 399 summed up the law on the
subject by quoting from a Texas case:
a 19 « « when a corporation will be regarded as the
adjunct, creature, instrumentality, device, stooge, or dummy
of another corporation is usually held to be a question of fact
in each case. As above stated the genei^ rule js that the sep
arate corporate entity of corporations wilTbe observed by
the courts, even though one may dominate or control another,'
br~~riia:y^tfeat^ it as a mere department,_jristrumentality,
ageire^petcTy and courts will disregard the separate legal iden-
^tties^t' tli^orporation only when one is used to defeat pub-
Ti^co5ryenieni%~JnstifV wrongs, protect fraud or crime of the
Other.' " "
The Delaware corporation created and uses the Virginia
corporation not for the purpose of getting around the law
but for the purpose of obeying the law. We therefore hold
that the corporate entity cannot properly be ignored and that
the Delaware corporation is engaged only in interstate busi
ness in the State of Virginia. Since the lax is a property tux
it ia-eonatitutional even though the taxpayer does no intra
state business.
Hooker, Chairman, and King, Commissioner, concur.
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page 53 [■ COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION
City of Richmond, August 4, 1952.
APPLICATION OF RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, IN
CORPORATED, FOR CORRECTION OF ASSESS
MENT AND REFUND OF TAXES (1950, CASE NO.
10629; 1951, CASE NO. 10767).
Case No. 10629.
Case No. 10767.
The Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, having filed
due notice of appeal in these cases, and counsel for that cor
poration, the Attorney General of Virginia, by Henry T.
Wickham, Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, and coun
sel for this ommission having agreed that Exhibits 6, 7 and
8 in Case No. 10767 only accompany the record on appeal;
It is ordered that the exhibits mentioned, numbered and
described as follows, be forwarded to the Clerk of Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia to be returned by him to this
commission with the mandate of that court:
Exhibit No. Description
6  Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, Taxes
and Assessments, Va., 1931 thru 1951.
7  Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, of
Virginia, Taxes and Assessments, 1933 thru
1951.
!  8 Copy of letter, Dec. 10, 1942, and enclosure,
from H. S. Marx to J. C. Masten.
A True Copy '
Teste:
.1
i  N.W.ATKINSON
Clerk of the State Corporation Conunission.
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page 54 } CERTIFICATE.
I, H. Lester Hooker, Chairman of the State Corporation
Commission, under the seal of the Commission, certify that
the foregoing record contains all the facts upon which the ac
tion appealed from was based and which are essential for the
proper decision of the appeal, together with such of the evi
dence introduced before the Commission as has been selected,
specified and required to be certified by any party in interest.
H. LESTER HOOKER
(SEAL) Chairman.
Attest:
N. W. ATKINSOH
Clerk of the Commission.
I, N. W. Atkinson, Clerk of the State Coi*poration Commis
sion, certify that, within sixty days after the final order or
judgment in these two cases, counsel for the Appellant filed
with me a notice of appeal in each case which had been de
livered to Counsel for the Commission and the Attorney Gen
eral of Virginia.
N. W. ATKINSON.
Clerk.
A Copy—Teste:
H. G. TURNER, C. C.
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